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The Dual World Polity: Fragmentation
and Integration in the Network
Of Intergovernmental Organizations
 
Jason Beckﬁeld,
 
Harvard University
 
A growing body of research demonstrates powerful effects of international organizations on national
policy, and the literature on international conﬂict is increasingly adopting a network perspective on interna-
tional organizations, but we still know little about the network structure of the world polity itself. This is sur-
prising in light of the theoretical implications of world polity theory, world systems theory, and the world
civilizations approach to the structure of the world polity. Using data on a set of prominent intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), along with a comparison to the complete population of IGOs, this study examines the
world polity as a network structured by symbolic and material conﬂict. Network analysis reveals a contradictory
duality in the structure of the world polity: while states are densely interconnected through international organi-
zations, these international organizations are only sparsely interconnected. Contrary to world polity theory,
world system position and world civilization predict position in the world polity. These results show that, in
neglecting the network structure of the world polity, previous research has underestimated the extent of struc-
tural inequality in the world polity. Because embeddedness in the world polity has such powerful effects on state
policies, international trade, and international conﬂict, the centralization and fragmentation of the world polity
may have disintegrative implications for world politics. Keywords: globalization, world polity, world society,
regionalization, network analysis.
 
The global network of states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), which com-
prises a central part of the 
 
world polity
 
, is shifting the balance of sovereignty among national
and global actors, and as such represents a central public concern and social issue (Goldman
2001; Hardt and Negri 2000; Held et al. 1999; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Sassen 1996;
Slaughter 2004; Smith 2001; Smith, Solinger, and Topik 1999; Strange 1996).
 
1
 
 Over the
course of the last century, the population of IGOs grew exponentially, as did states’ member-
ships in those organizations (Boli and Thomas 1997, 1999a). As social scientists grapple with
this process of political globalization, many rely on the insights of neoinstitutionalist world
polity theory (Barrett and Tsui 1999; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Boli and Thomas 1997,
1999a, 1999b; Boyle, Songora, and Foss 2001; Guillén 2001; Katzenstein, Keohane and Kras-
ner 1998; Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez 1997; O’Riain 2000; Thomas and Meyer 1984).
 
1. The globalization movement has tended to focus on 
 
economic
 
 rather than 
 
political 
 
globalization, but it has ori-
ented toward international organizations that promote neoliberal trade policy and thus reﬂect the intersection of the
political and economic dimensions of globalization (Bandy 2004; Fisher et al. 2005; Goldman 2001). 
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Scholarship from this perspective shows that becoming enmeshed in the world polity—by
joining international organizations—is related to policy adoption across diverse domains:
education (Schafer 1999; Schofer and Meyer 2005), environmental protection (Frank,
Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Schofer and Hironaka 2005), women’s suffrage (Ramirez,
Soysal, and Shanahan1997), gender equality (True and Mintrom 2001), same-sex sexual
relations (Frank and McEneaney 1999), and human rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui
2005). Indeed, world polity research shows that the effects of the world polity often outweigh
the effects of traditional national-level factors. 
Recent work also suggests that international organizations—and IGOs in particular—
matter for trade (Ingram , Robinson, and Busch 2005), neoliberal restructuring (Henisz, Zelner,
and Guillen 2005), international conﬂict (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Hafner-
Burton and Montgomery 2006), and transnational social movement organizations (Smith
and Wiest 2005). This newer work, following John Oneal and Bruce Russett (1997), has used
the tools of network analysis to understand how dyadic ties among states through their
memberships in international organizations inﬂuence a range of outcomes. However, this
“network turn” has yet to be taken to understand the essential structural properties of the
world polity itself. That is, research demonstrates that the network structure matters, but this
work has not yet considered the theoretical implications for network structure. Moreover,
although research on the effects of world polity ties has begun to disaggregate the IGO ﬁeld
into distinct sets of organizations (Boehmer et al. 2004; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001;
Ingram et al. 2005; Kim and Barnett 2000), work on the structure of the world polity has not
gone far in this direction. This article moves further toward disaggregating the world polity by
employing two sets of IGOs for the analysis: a set of highly visible IGOs identiﬁed by editors
of international handbooks, and the complete population of IGOs identiﬁed by the 
 
Correlates
of War
 
 project.
In sum, emphasis on the 
 
effects
 
 and 
 
content
 
 of the world polity has overshadowed basic
research on its 
 
structure
 
 and 
 
shape
 
. Several crucial questions remain unresolved. In the con-
text of exponential growth in the number of international organizations, does the network
take the shape of a densely integrated, decentralized, cohesive web, or a sparse, fragmented,
centralized network with uneven areas of integration and disconnection? Has the size and
inclusiveness of IGOs kept up with the growth in the population of IGOs? Do the new IGOs
look more like the universal-membership United Nations (UN), or more like the limited-
membership European Union (EU) and Arab League (AL)? Answers to these questions
about the network structure of the world polity matter for four reasons: (1) as the new net-
work research demonstrates, involvement in the world polity affects national policy and
international politics; (2) world polity theory, world systems theory, and the world civiliza-
tions approach make contradictory claims about the structure of the world polity; (3) the
extent of inequality in the world polity may be understated by research that uses simple
counts of memberships in international organizations; and (4) actors with privileged posi-
tions in the network will be advantaged (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973; Padgett and Ansell
1993). 
In this article, I employ network analysis to take the next step toward understanding the
structure of the world polity in 1950 and 2000. These years, 1950 and 2000, provide crucial
snapshots, given the formation of the UN system in 1945 and the explosive growth in the
population of states and IGOs since then. As John Meyer and colleagues (1997) note: “the
development and impact of global sociocultural structuration greatly intensiﬁed with the cre-
ation of a central world organizational frame at the end of World War II” (p. 163). What sort
of a structure did this structuration make? In this article, I develop hypotheses concerning the
structure of the network from the world polity, world systems, and world civilizations
approaches, and I test these hypotheses using techniques designed for network data. Analyz-
ing the world polity appropriately as a network uncovers substantial—and surprising, in light
of some of the claims made by world polity theory—structural inequality, centralization, and
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fragmentation. Thus, political globalization may carry disintegrative implications for world
politics.
To anticipate the results, this disintegration of the world polity is described in two distinct
dimensions of the structure of the network. I conceptualize the world polity as a bimodal net-
work, or a network that encompasses two theoretically distinct categories of nodes: IGOs and
states.
 
2
 
 To grasp the “duality” (Breiger 1974) of this network, it is necessary to analyze two net-
works: ﬁrst, the unimodal network of IGOs, where ties represent common member states; and
second, the unimodal network of states, where ties represent co-memberships in IGOs. Both
networks relate to the theoretical stakes, but in different ways. The IGO network best captures
the structural impact of the composition of the IGO ﬁeld: its regionalization, along with its cen-
tralization around a small number of IGOs. That much structural inequality appears on the
organizational side of the network suggests that the composition of the ﬁeld of international
organizations—especially the predominance of regional organizations—signiﬁcantly structures
the world polity network as a whole. Examining the IGO network opens up a new set of ques-
tions about the interorganizational side of the world polity, and allows for empirical tests of
claims about possibilities for diffusion among organizations (Frank et al. 1999; Simmons, Dob-
bin, and Garrett 2006; Simmons and Elkins 2005). Examining the IGO network also affords a
look at the possible organizational sources of connection and disconnection in the world polity,
along with the potential for the production and dissemination of complementary or contradic-
tory policy scripts (Frank et al. 1999:99).
In turn, the interstate network comes closest to the dyadic conception of world polity
relations employed in research following the network turn, and reveals the density of rela-
tions among states in the international system, along with the centralization of the network
around the most active states. The unimodal state network also allows for tests of hypotheses
that world polity ties are shaped by attributes of states, including world system position and
world civilization. It is essential to examine both the presence or absence and the relative
strength of network connections in understanding the structure of the world polity, given
that the presence or absence of ties reveals the basic architecture of the network, while the
strength of ties more sensitively taps the extent of inequality in the network. Again, antici-
pating the analysis (discussed in greater detail below), I employ both the binary presence/
absence network and the valued strength network to describe fully the network structure of
the world polity.
 
Approaches to the Structure of the World Polity
 
World Polity Theory
 
World polity theory holds that states embedded in the world polity receive “policy
scripts” that prescribe legitimate action (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997). IGOs like
the UN create, carry, and embody the world culture in the world polity, diffusing policy
scripts to states (Meyer 2000; Strang and Meyer 1993), and states adopt common policies as
they grow more integrated into international organizations. For instance, states tied more
closely to the world polity create agencies promoting gender equality earlier (True and Mint-
rom 2001), enact pro-environment policies sooner (Frank 1999; Frank et al. 2000), and
implement more liberal policies on same-sex sexual relations (Frank and McEneaney 1999).
The theory shares with the “third force” approach an optimism toward the ability of the
 
2. As noted above, the world polity includes other categories of nodes as well, such as international nongovern-
mental organizations (INGOs), suggesting that the structure of the world polity actually includes more dimensions than
those examined in this article. The quality and quantity of relations among all these modes raises a host of important
theoretical questions for future work.
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world polity to counter traditional geopolitical forces (Bratton 1989; Florini 2000; Rice and
Ritchie 1995; Shaw 1991).
 
3
 
 
Some argue that world polity theory downplays power and inequality (Hall and Taylor
1996:954; Smith 2000:1575; Stinchcombe 1997:17; Thelen 1999:387). Paul DiMaggio and
Walter Powell (1983:157) note that the theory does not fully account for power and interests,
nor does it attend to questions about who beneﬁts from institutions. Signiﬁcantly, world pol-
ity theory views the structure of the world polity as progressing toward a relatively ﬂat struc-
ture, as all states, especially those in poor countries, integrate into the world polity at a faster
rate. More speciﬁcally, although world polity and “third force” international relations schol-
ars acknowledge inequality in participation in the world polity, and in fact show that varia-
tion in embeddedness drives variation in policy outcomes, they downplay this inequality, or
argue that while there is structural inequality, it is on the decline (Boli and Thomas 1999a;
Florini 2000). In its structure, the world polity is said to be increasingly universal and nonhi-
erarchical: membership in international organizations is “a social imperative” (Boli, Loya and
Loftin 1999:56) and “practically compulsory” (p. 76) for states. In earlier work (Beckﬁeld
2003), I show that inequality in the 
 
number
 
 of memberships in IGOs declined dramatically,
and to a very low level, by the year 2000.
World polity theory implies several hypotheses concerning the basic structure of the net-
work of IGOs and states (these and the other hypotheses developed below are summarized in
Table 1). First, if the world polity is “a world of Durkheimian and Simmelian integration”
(Meyer et al. 1997:175) and “a rapidly growing web of global links that envelop the world
without regard for local topography and conditions” (Boli et al. 1999:77), the network should
be densely interconnected, and should become more so over time. Second, if the world polity
can be characterized as “stubbornly decentralized” (Boli and Thomas 1997:172), the network
should not be centralized around structurally privileged states or IGOs, and any centralization
in the network should decline with time. That is, if the world polity is a world where univer-
salist (rather than exclusive) international organizations predominate, the network of states
and international organizations would not resemble a “star-shaped” network where a few
organizations and states have many more world polity ties than others. Third, neither a
state’s position in the world system, nor its civilization alignment, should account for its ties
to international organizations. That is, world polity theory predicts that dyads of states will
become densely interconnected through common ties to international organizations, regard-
less of how economically, culturally, or geographically similar the dyads are.
 
Table 1 •
 
Structural Hypotheses Derived from World Polity Theory, World Systems Theory, and the 
World Civilizations Approach
 
World Polity
Level/Change
World System
Level/Change
World Civ.
Level/Change
 
Unimodal network (IGO dyads)
 
Density high/increase low/stable low/decrease
Centralization low/decrease high/stable low/decrease
 
Unimodal network (state dyads)
 
Density high/increase low/stable low/decrease
Centralization low/decrease high/stable low/decrease
World system model fit low/decrease high/increase low/decrease
World civilization model fit low/decrease low/decrease high/increase
 
3. The “third force” refers to international civil society, as counterpoised to the “ﬁrst force” of the interstate system
and the “second force” of the international market economy. This literature examines the capacity of international civil
society (often through INGOs) to counteract the effects of states and markets in the international system.
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In connecting the network concepts of density and centralization to world polity theory
(and to the other theories extended below), these concepts require explication. For the pur-
poses of this article, density is used in the network sense, as the proportion of possible ties
between dyads that are realized in the observed data. That is, I develop and test hypotheses
relating to both the volume and the pattern of world polity ties. This means that while the
overall volume of connections within the world polity may suggest an increase in the density
of the system as a whole, I argue that the speciﬁc pattern of these ties also matters—it matters
as much for the world polity that Western European countries have expanded their world
polity ties to a very high level as it does that states in other parts of the world have connected
to the world polity at a much lower level, if at all. Similarly, on the IGO side of the network,
it matters as much for centralization and regionalization that universalist organizations like
the UN are tied directly to regional organizations like the EU and to economic organizations
like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as it does that
regional organizations like the EU and the AL do not share member states. While the impact
of density (or sparseness) and centralization (or decentralization) on the content and effects
of world polity ties remains an open question, it is an important next step to examine these
structural qualities.
 
4
 
Previous research on the structure (versus the effects) of the world polity is limited by its
treatment of involvement in the world polity as an attribute of states: involvement in the
world polity is measured as the number of memberships in international organizations
(including IGOs), but the network itself is not described (Beckﬁeld 2003; Boli et al. 1999; Feld
and Jordan 1988; Jacobson 1979; Jacobson, Reisinger, and Mathers 1986; Shanks, Jacobson
and Kaplan 1996; Wallace and Singer 1970).
 
5
 
 This is a serious oversight, because measuring
world political involvement as an attribute of states rather than relations among IGOs and
states masks important structural properties of the world polity. For instance, inequality in
the number of states’ ties to IGOs decreased dramatically since 1960 (Beckﬁeld 2003). How-
ever, this may mean little for the structure of the network. It is possible, for instance, that
states become more equal in the number of IGO memberships they hold, but that states
become less similar in precisely which IGOs they hold memberships in. That is, it could be the
case that inequality in states’ IGO ties decreases while the network itself becomes less densely
interconnected, and states become less similar in the 
 
pattern
 
 of ties they hold to IGOs. Fur-
thermore, counts of states’ IGO memberships say nothing about inequality among IGOs, as
the ﬁeld of IGOs could grow more or less densely interconnected, and more or less central-
ized, as inequality in the number of states’ IGO memberships declines.
Another limitation of previous work on the distribution of world polity ties is that states’
ties to 
 
every
 
 active IGO in a given year are counted in the data set that most studies use (UIA
2000). As has long been recognized by international relations scholars (Singer and Wallace
1970; Gartzke et al. 2001), this blurs important distinctions among organizational ﬁelds,
lumping disparate organizations together indiscriminately. This also weights membership in,
for instance, the World Meteorological Organization the same as membership in, for instance,
the EU.
 
6
 
 Though this comprehensive count of IGO memberships has been shown to be
 
4. A signiﬁcant limitation of this analysis is that it does not examine within-IGO ties. As one can note, large IGOs
like the UN entail multiple agencies, each of which may exhibit more or less densely interconnected memberships. Like-
wise, a full understanding of the structure of the world polity is incomplete without a case-based, process-focused exam-
ination of how the structure translates into content and effects.
5.  Frank et al. (1999) highlight interorganizational linkages as an aspect of the “rise of the environment in world
culture” (p. 81). In this account, the dense connections among environmental IGOs and INGOs are interpreted as evi-
dence “that the environment has become institutionalized in world culture” (p. 90), suggesting one way that the associ-
ational structure and the cultural content of world society may relate.
6. The standard UIA data set also includes some questionable classiﬁcations of IGOs. For instance, the EU is classi-
ﬁed as a “fund” and states’ EU memberships are thus excluded from the counts of IGO memberships used in much
world polity research (UIA 2000:viii, 876).
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related to state policy, it is possible that states are exposed to different policy scripts within
different ﬁelds of IGOs, and it is possible that more visible IGOs such as the EU and the UN
exert stronger policy effects (cf., Ingram et al. 2005). Below, I compare the complete popula-
tion of IGOs to a select set of visible IGOs.
I underscore the distinction between hypotheses about the structure of the contempo-
rary world polity versus hypotheses about how the structure of the world polity has changed
in the crucial post-World War II era (the hypotheses are summarized in Table 1). While world
polity scholars clearly appreciate that some states belong to more international organizations
than others (Boli et al. 1999), they emphasize that this inequality is declining (Beckﬁeld
2003; Boli et al. 1999). That is, although a high level of structural inequality in the world pol-
ity is not inconsistent with the expectations of world polity theory, and thus not adjudicative
of the competing hypotheses, world polity theory does imply that structural inequality
should be on the decline, as states form and join global IGOs like the UN. Thus, although a
static analysis of the contemporary network structure of the world polity represents a signiﬁ-
cant advance over current literature, adding an earlier time point to the analysis as a baseline
for comparison allows for a more stringent test of the relevant hypotheses.
 
World System in the World Polity
 
Characterization of the world 
 
polity
 
 as ﬂat contrasts with the vision of the world 
 
system
 
 as
a hierarchical network of nation-states bound by competitive, unequal relations (Chase-
Dunn and Grimes 1995; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000). World systems theory characterizes
international organizations as “sites of conﬂict and power” (Boswell and Chase-Dunn
2000:199), in the same way that the international trade network reﬂects global inequality.
From this perspective, the world polity develops within the 
 
world order
 
, or “the agreed upon
and normative rules of international relations” (p. 24). Because world orders are established
by core hegemons and beneﬁt the international capitalist class, world political organizations
become “boards of directors for ruling states” (p. 238). In this radical conception of the world
polity, core states use international organizations to establish and enforce an international
order designed to their beneﬁt. Structurally, this implies a dominance of the core over the
world polity, with a more limited participation of peripheral states in those organizations that
are captured by the core. 
While the world systems approach suggests that the number of world polity ties may be
an important resource, it is position in the world polity—the patterning of ties to particular
states and organizations—rather than the volume of ties on its own that matters. If the world
systems account is correct, position in the world system is likely to be especially relevant to
position in the world polity, since the core has a material interest in maintaining the global
capitalist order through the creation and diffusion of policy scripts. Following the “conﬂict
model” of the world polity (Beckﬁeld 2003), core states can dominate the world polity in
multiple ways: by dominating the membership of existing IGOs, or by forming new IGOs, or
by restricting membership to IGOs. This argument implies that the world political network
should become increasingly dominated by core states, and contradicts the argument that
noncore states form IGOs to counter the neoliberal economic order (Krasner 1985). World
systems theory also suggests that core powers are especially likely to dominate more visible
IGOs; this is examined below in the comparison of the visible-IGO subset and the complete
population of IGOs. 
In the language of world systems theory, the “core-periphery hierarchy” is a “structural
constant” that is “continually reproduced,” and “further, while the scale of the system
increases as it expands, the structures have gotten larger without fundamentally changing”
(Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000:20). These ideas can be extended to suggest several struc-
tural hypotheses in the context of exponential growth in the population of and participation
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in IGOs. First, the world polity should be sparsely interconnected, and the density of the net-
work should remain stable over time, as the core continues its dominance of international
organizations. Second, the world polity should be highly centralized around structurally priv-
ileged states and IGOs, and should remain stably centralized, or even grow more centralized,
over time.
 
7
 
 Third, a world system model network where the core is tied to itself, the semipe-
riphery, and the periphery, but noncore states are not interconnected should explain the pat-
tern of world polity ties (and thus should help to account for stable centralization and
sparseness in the network). 
 
Culture and Geography in the World Polity
 
Samuel Huntington (1996) provocatively claims that the major geopolitical fault lines
are no longer economic or ideological (viz., capitalist versus communist), but are instead cul-
tural: “global politics is being reconﬁgured along cultural lines. Peoples and countries with
similar cultures are coming together. Peoples and countries with different cultures are coming
apart” (p. 125). Huntington argues that the world divides into roughly nine “civilizations”—
Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic (Chinese), Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and
Japanese—with distinct value systems (Inglehart and Baker 2000). According to Huntington,
the Western/non-Western cleavage is central, but the many non-Western civilizations also
differ, and there are important conﬂicts between them. These cultural distinctions are likely
to be especially relevant to the structure of the world polity, because the world polity con-
structs and reﬂects world culture. 
The world civilizations approach suggests structural hypotheses. First, if the world is
growing increasingly divided along cultural lines, the world polity should be sparsely inter-
connected, and the density of the network should decrease over time, as states form and join
IGOs based on cultural afﬁliation. That is, while the density of the network within civiliza-
tions will increase, the overall density of the network will decrease much more quickly, as
civilization alignment drives states toward one civilization and away from eight. Second, if
cultural conﬂict produces a world polity that is fragmented and multipolar, then the world
polity should exhibit a low level of centralization, and this centralization should decrease
with time. Third, states from common civilizations should belong to the same IGOs, resulting
in a network where states that share civilizations are closely interconnected, while states
aligned with different civilizations are disconnected. 
It is important to note that civilizational alignment corresponds closely with geo-
graphic region, so that a growing structuration of the network of IGOs and states by civili-
zation would also reﬂect a growing 
 
regionalization 
 
of the world polity (Fligstein and Merand
2002, Katzenstein 2005; Kim and Shin 2002), where regionalization can be conceptualized
as “the intensiﬁcation of international interaction within bounded regions” (Beckﬁeld
2006:966). This regionalization, which involves the construction of “social arenas where
people and organizations come to routinely interact” (Fligstein 2007:11) driven in part by
regional polities like the EU, the 
 
Mercado Común del Cono Sur
 
 (Mercosur), and the North
American Free Trade Agreement, might produce a fragmented world polity. Of course, it is
possible that regionalization and globalization are complementary or contradictory in their
effects, so I reiterate here that the analysis below speaks only to the associational structure
(and not the content) of world polity ties. If the structure of the world polity does corre-
spond to civilization/region, more work will be needed to disentangle the causes of this
associational structure.
 
7. The key distinction between the predictions of world polity theory and world systems theory for changing cen-
tralization is that between decreasing centralization and another pattern, as either stable centralization or increasing
centralization could reﬂect the consolidation of core interests in the world polity. Future work should also explore how
changes in the structure of capitalist accumulation relate to changes in the structure and effects of the world polity.
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Network Data and Analysis
 
The goal of this article is to use the techniques of network analysis (Wasserman and
Faust 1994) to describe the structure of the world polity. Speciﬁcally, I examine the properties
of density, centralization, and ﬁtness to ideal-typical model networks to assess how well the
various images of the world polity drawn from the literature characterize the actual world-
political network. Below, I describe the network data, and detail how I calculate the network
properties of density, centralization, and ﬁtness to models.
Network analysis requires 
 
relational
 
 rather than 
 
attributional
 
 data. Whereas the typical
data structure used in linear regression analysis is the rectangular case-by-variable matrix,
where cell 
 
x
 
ij
 
 represents an observation on variable 
 
j
 
 for case 
 
i
 
, the classical network analysis
data structure is the square case-by-case matrix, where cell 
 
x
 
ij
 
 represents a tie between 
 
nodes
 
 
 
i
 
and 
 
j
 
 on a given relation. For this network analysis of the world polity, the data form a 
 
bimo-
dal
 
 network with two distinct sets of nodes: states and IGOs (on bimodal networks, see
Breiger [1974] and Galaskiewicz [1985]). The 1950 network of prominent IGOs, discussed in
more detail below, can be thought of as an 11 
 
×
 
 102 (11 IGOs and 102 states) binary matrix
where an entry in cell 
 
x
 
ij
 
 indicates membership of state 
 
j
 
 in IGO 
 
i
 
. The 2000 data matrix is also
bimodal, with the 50 rows representing 50 IGOs and the 206 columns representing the 206
states. Network analysis of bimodal data typically focuses on unimodal 
 
co-membership
 
 and
 
overlap
 
 networks implicit in the bimodal network. In the network of states and IGOs, the
bimodal network can be used to generate a state-by-state square, valued co-membership
matrix where cell 
 
x
 
ij
 
 gives the number of IGOs that states 
 
i
 
 and 
 
j
 
 hold common membership
in. Likewise, an IGO-by-IGO square, valued overlap matrix can also be generated, where cell
 
x
 
ij
 
 indicates the number of states that are members of both IGO 
 
i
 
 and 
 
j
 
. 
I use two sets of IGOs for the analysis: a list of prominent IGOs as compiled by editors of
international handbooks, and a list of the complete population of IGOs identiﬁed by the 
 
Cor-
relates of War
 
 project. The list of prominent IGOs comes from two sources: 
 
The
 
 
 
Statesman’s Year-
book
 
 (Steinberg 1950; Turner 2000) and 
 
The
 
 
 
Europa Yearbook
 
 (Europa Publications 1961,
2000). 
 
The Statesman’s Yearbook 
 
has been published since 1863; 
 
The Europa Yearbook
 
, since
1926. Both are often used as a data source in comparative and international relations
research (e.g., Meyer et al. 1997; Moon 2003; Oneal and Russett 2001). For the analysis, an
IGO and its members were included in the data if the IGO appeared in either source. Tables 2
and 3 list the IGOs included in the ﬁrst data set.
 
8
 
 
I also use data on the complete population of IGOs, as assembled and distributed by John
Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke (2004) as part of the 
 
Correlates of War
 
project. Pevehouse and associates (2004:103) note that “the broadest understanding of what
constitutes an IGO is that the organization (1) is a formal entity, (2) has states as members,
and (3) possesses a permanent secretariat or other indication of institutionalization such as
headquarters and/or permanent staff.” The 1950 network includes 119 IGOs and 82 states;
the 2000 network, 330 IGOs and 190 states. These data are commonly employed by interna-
tional relations scholars who study interstate dyads (Boehmer et al. 2004; Oneal and Russett
1997; Russett, Oneal and Davis 1998). For both the list of prominent IGOs and the popula-
tion of IGOs identiﬁed by Pevehouse and associates (2004), the raw data are simply IGO
membership lists, which are transformed by the UCINET network analysis software package
 
8. I replicated the density and centralization analyses for 1950 and 1992 (the latest year available), using Gartzke’s
data on interstate ties through maximally-institutionalized IGOs (Boehmer et al. 2004). For the valued interstate net-
work, density increases from 6.982 to 13.227, while centralization decreases slightly from .127 to .114. Examining ties
through minimally-institutionalized IGOs, again using the valued network, density increases from 1.256 to 4.357, while
centralization decreases from .174 to .100. That these results are consistent with those shown below (see Tables 4 and 5)
suggests that the results are not driven by the method used to select the sample of IGOs.
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(Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002) into the bimodal matrices. From these bimodal net-
works, unimodal networks are generated. 
Appendix A shows illustrative extracts of the data matrices (from the subsample of
prominent IGOs). In the ﬁrst matrix, a 1 indicates the membership of a state in an IGO. Alge-
ria is a member of the AL, Brazil is a member of the Common Market of the Southern Cone,
and all the states shown in this small extract of the data are members of the UN. The second
matrix shows the ties among organizations that are formed by common member states. For
instance, the EU shares no members in common with the AL or OPEC, but shares 11 mem-
bers in common with NATO, and all 15 members of the EU are also members of the UN. The
diagonal of this matrix shows the number of states that belong to each organization: the AL
has 22 members, the Common Market of the Southern Cone, or Mercosur, has 4 members,
and so on. The third matrix shows how strongly states are connected through common mem-
berships in IGOs. For instance, the United States and Germany are very tightly connected,
with 9 IGOs in common, whereas the United States is more distant from Algeria, with only 2
IGOs in common. The diagonal shows the total number of IGOs each state holds member-
ships in: Germany and the United States are both very active, with 14 IGO ties each.
Before turning to the details of the analysis, the implications of the changing population
of IGOs should be explicitly considered. It is apparent from a comparison of Tables 2 and 3
that there are far more regional IGOs in 2000 than there were in 1950, and more heterogene-
ity in the IGO ﬁeld more generally. Indeed, the reader might ask whether this changing pop-
ulation of IGOs predetermines the results of the analysis. The reader might also ask whether
regional IGOs should be excluded from the analysis, since it is difﬁcult to consider every state
a viable candidate for membership in every regional IGO. In response, I argue that the
appearance of so many regional IGOs itself carries important theoretical implications, and
relates to general ontological debates within the globalization literature (Fligstein 2001;
Guillén 2001). Clearly, the IGO population need not have seen the appearance of so many
regional IGOs, and indeed there is no reason why universalist IGOs could not have ﬂourished
at an equal or greater rate. This counterfactual is a theoretically meaningful and practically
plausible baseline for comparison. Moreover, regions and regional boundaries are socially
constructed and negotiated political projects (Katzenstein 2005). Turkey’s current candidacy
for membership in the EU is a notable case of this. Finally, the presence of regional organiza-
tions could be consistent with a dense or sparse, centralized or decentralized network. 
Although it is important to bear in mind both the substantive and methodological impor-
tance of regional organizations, I also conducted a supplemental analysis holding the sample
of IGOs constant across the two time points. The ten IGOs in this subsample are the IGOs
shown in Table 2, less the Commission for Economic Cooperation, a Soviet-era organization
 
Table 2 •
 
Prominent Intergovernmental Organizations, 1950
 
Arab League
British Commonwealth and Empire
Brussels Treaty Organization
Caribbean Commission
Commission for Economic Cooperation
Council of Europe
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Organization for European Economic Cooperation
Organization of American States
South Pacific Commission
United Nations
 
Sources
 
: 
 
The Statesman’s Yearbook
 
 (Steinberg 1950) and 
 
The Europa Year
Book
 
 (Europa Publicaitons 1961)
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Table 3 •
 
 Prominent Intergovernmental Organizations, 2000
 
African Development Bank
Andean Community
Antarctic Treaty
Arab Maghreb Union
Asian Development Bank
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Association of Caribbean States
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Group
Caribbean Community*
Central American Integration System
Central European Initiative
Colombo Plan
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Commonwealth, formerly British Commonwealth and Empire*
Commonwealth of Independent States
Co-Operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
Council of Baltic Sea States
Council of Europe*
Danube Commission
Economic Community of West African States
Economic Cooperation Organization
European Free Trade Association
European Space Agency
European Union
Franc Zone
Francophonie Institutionnelle
Inter-American Development Bank
International Organization for Migration
Lake Chad Basin Commission
Latin American Integration Association
League of Arab States, formerly Arab League* 
Nordic Council 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization*
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, formerly OEEC* 
Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Organization of African Unity 
Organization of American States* 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
Organization of the Islamic Conference 
Pacific Community, formerly South Pacific Commission*
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
South Pacific Forum 
Southern African Development Community 
Southern Common Market 
United Nations* 
Western European Union, formerly Brussels Treaty Organization*
 
Sources
 
: 
 
Statesman’s Yearbook
 
 (Turner 2000) and 
 
Europa Year Book
 
 (Europa Publications 2000)
*Indicates an IGO that was present in 1950
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whose members were Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR. To anticipate the results, which are discussed in
the text below, this supplemental analysis of a constant subsample of IGOs is consistent with
the results shown in the tables for the prominent IGOs and the complete population of IGOs.
This suggests that the results are not simply a function of the changing population of IGOs,
but also reﬂect signiﬁcant changes in the structure of states’ involvement with world polity
organizations.
Conceptualizing and analyzing the world polity as two distinct networks—one of IGOs
and one of states—provides critical leverage on the question of how the structure of the
world polity is evolving. The networks of IGOs and states reveal different aspects of the struc-
ture of the world polity. The IGO network can be used to assess the universality of IGOs in
their membership. Analysis of this network can show whether the world polity is better char-
acterized as a dense web of IGOs that share many members in common, or a sparser web
where IGOs do not share many members. It is also possible to determine whether the
increasing participation of states in IGOs produces a more densely interwoven world polity,
or the increasing involvement of states in IGOs is offset by the creation of new IGOs. The uni-
modal network of states also helps reveal structural characteristics of the world polity. The
interstate network shows the pattern of connections between states formed by their IGO
memberships. Analysis of this network can show how densely states are tied together, and
whether the interstate network is best characterized as a ﬂat structure where all states are
tied to each other fairly evenly, or an unequal structure where some states are knitted closely
together through common IGO memberships while others remain isolated at the periphery of
the world polity. 
For both the inter-IGO and the inter-state network, I calculate measures for the binary
network, where ties are simply present (= 1) or absent (= 0), and for the valued network,
where ties are counts of connections. I examine both the binary and valued networks
because each reveals distinct aspects of the network structure. The binary network more
closely approximates the basic architecture of the world polity, including points of connection
and disconnection. Most importantly, the binary network more accurately represents the
overall pattern of ties, while analysis of the valued network can be swamped by a few active
nodes. For instance, density would be biased upward by a highly-skewed degree distribution,
in the same way that “average income” is affected by a skewed income distribution. Density
and centralization, discussed in detail below, are also more easily interpreted when calculated
for binary networks, since both range from 0 to 1 for binary networks (the theoretical range
is undeﬁned for valued networks). Analysis of the valued networks, on the other hand,
shows how strongly states and organizations are intertwined, which is signiﬁcant given that
research on the effects of world polity ties typically employs a count of memberships in inter-
national organizations. 
 
Density
 
The fundamental structural claims of world polity theory concern the density of the net-
work: the world polity is argued to be a densely interconnected network with close ties
among organizations and states. Density is one of the most basic properties of a network: it is
the proportion of potential ties within a network that are actually observed. Because “poten-
tial ties” include ties from states outside regions with regional organizations, the density of
the bimodal network is relevant to an assessment of the regionalization of the world polity.
For unimodal, symmetric networks without self-ties, density is:
D 
 
=
 
 
 
t
 
/
 
g
 
(
 
g 
 
−
 
 1), (1)
where 
 
t
 
 is the total number of ties in the network, and 
 
g
 
 is the number of nodes in the net-
work (Wasserman and Faust 1994:102).
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Density is calculated for both sets of IGOs, and, within each set, for both networks: the
network of IGOs and the network of states. The density of the network of IGOs reveals
what proportion of IGO dyads share a member state in common, while the density of the
network of states reveals what proportion of state dyads share membership in a common
IGO. The range of density for a binary network is 0 to 1, and density in such networks is
interpreted as the proportion of possible ties that are realized. For valued networks, the
theoretical range is undeﬁned; density in valued networks is the average strength of a tie. I
note that “density” is employed here in strictly network-analytic terms, as deﬁned above.
While Tables 2 and 3 show that the opportunities for world polity ties have grown enor-
mously, it is an open empirical question whether this increase, or potential future
increases, result in a world polity that is more or less densely knit together by memberships
of states in international organizations.
 
Centralization
 
I measure structural inequality in the networks as centralization. Centralization is a net-
work-level index that varies from 0 to 1 and captures the extent to which the network has
one central node and many peripheral nodes (Wasserman and Faust 1994). As such, it taps a
strict variety of hierarchy. Speciﬁcally, I analyze degree centralization, which quantiﬁes the
extent to which the network has one central node with ties to all other actors, but no ties
between the other actors (Freeman 1979). The formula is:
C
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where 
 
C
 
D
 
(
 
n
 
*) is the degree centrality of the most central node, 
 
C
 
D
 
(
 
ni) is the degree centrality
of node i, and g is the number of nodes in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994:180). In
binary networks, the centralization index ranges from 0 to 1. In a decentralized network
where every node has a tie to all other nodes, or where all nodes have the same number of
ties, the centralization index would equal 0. Conversely, a centralization index of 1 would be
observed for a perfectly centralized, star-shaped network with one central node. While cen-
tralization and density are related (in that a maximally-dense network is minimally central-
ized), they describe conceptually distinct aspects of network structure. A dense network can
be relatively centralized (star-shaped) or decentralized, as can a sparse network (Wasserman
and Faust 1994).
9
Fit of Model Networks to Observed Networks
Density and centralization are descriptive characteristics. As such, they can be used to
test the claims made by the various approaches about the basic structure of the world polity,
but they have limited utility for assessing the correspondence of the observed structure to a
model. Both the world systems and world civilizations approaches imply speciﬁc models of
world polity structure. The world systems approach to the world polity implies that core
states should be tied to core, semiperipheral, and peripheral states, while semiperipheral and
peripheral states should be tied only to core states.
10 The world civilizations approach implies
9. This is related to the connection between inequality in the number of ties and structural inequality in a net-
work: states can exhibit similar levels of IGO ties, but if states are systematically tied to different IGOs, there may still
remain signiﬁcant structural inequality.
10. This model represents the world system as a core-periphery structure, and as such treats semiperipheral states
as equivalent to peripheral states with respect to the world polity. While alternative models are possible, the model used
here allows for a conservative test. Data on world system position come from Bollen’s (1983) and Bollen and Appold’s
(1993) updates of Snyder and Kick (1979), supplemented with information from Kentor (2000) and World Bank (2002)
for states not included in the original sources. 
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that Western states should be tied to other Western states; Islamic states should be tied to
other Islamic states, and so on.
11 
To evaluate these competing explanations of the pattern of world polity ties, I construct
idealized world system and world civilization networks and compare them to the observed
world polity data. These networks are represented as square, binary, symmetric matrices
(Appendix B shows small extracts for illustration). To compare model to data, I estimate
Pearson correlations (range: -1 to 1) between these hypothetical networks and the observed
data. Because the observations are not independent, statistical signiﬁcance cannot be
assessed in the standard way, so I instead employ the nonparametric quadratic assignment
procedure (QAP). As implemented in UCINET, QAP randomly permutes the observed data
matrix 5,000 times, calculating a correlation between each permuted data matrix and the
model matrix. Statistical signiﬁcance is indicated by the proportion of random permutations
that produce a correlation as large as that observed between the data and model matrices.
See Kadushin (1995), Mizruchi (1990), and Padgett and Ansell (1993) for applications of the
QAP method.
Results
Density
The hypotheses concerning density of the world political network are clear. World polity
theory holds that the world polity is densely interconnected, and should become more so
over time. In contrast, world systems theory predicts a sparse network that changes little over
time, and the world civilizations approach suggests a sparse network that becomes even
sparser over time as civilization- and region-based IGOs fragment the world polity. Table 4
shows results from the density analysis.
Analysis of density in the unimodal IGO and interstate networks reveals the dual struc-
ture of the world polity. On the IGO side of the network, the memberships of IGOs overlap
less in 2000 than in 1950. In 1950, 64 percent of prominent IGO dyads (and 79 percent of all
IGO dyads) shared at least one state as a member. By 2000, only 40 percent of prominent
IGO dyads (and 53 percent of all IGO dyads) had at least one common member state. These
results also hold for the subsample of ten prominent IGOs present in both 1950 and 2000: in
this network, 76 percent of IGOs shared at least one member state in common in 1950, but
this declined to 67 percent by 2000. This suggests that IGOs are becoming less universal in
their membership, which is more consistent with the world systems and world civilization
approaches to the world polity. The analysis of the valued inter-IGO network shows that the
IGOs that are tied together are tied together slightly more closely in 2000 than in 1950 (up
from 3.18 to 3.37 for prominent IGOs, up from 6.51 to 6.83 for all IGOs, and up from 3.82 to
8.78 for the time-invariant sample of ten IGOs). This difference between the decreasing den-
sity of the binary network and the increasing density of the valued network suggests that the
topology of the world polity is growing more uneven, fragmented, and marked by areas of
tight interconnection and zones of disconnection.
World polity theory better accounts for the structure of the state co-membership net-
work than for the structure of the IGO network. In interpreting the results for the interstate
network, I note that only one IGO would be necessary to produce a binary state-by-state net-
work with density equal to 1, if every state were a member of that IGO. The results show that
in the sample of prominent IGOs, fewer than half of state dyads had a common IGO membership
11. Data on civilization come from Huntington (1996), supplemented with information from CIA (2002).
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in 1950, but this increased sharply to 86 percent in 2000.
12 In the population of IGOs, the
interstate network is also very dense, increasing from .90 in 1950 to just shy of 1.0 in 2000.
There is a similar increase in density in the interstate network created by the subsample of
ten IGOs: density changes from .49 to .83. Interestingly, the analysis of the valued interstate
network shows that the average strength of interstate ties also increased dramatically, sup-
porting world polity theory. In 1950, states shared an average of .58 prominent IGO ties, and
this increased to 1.76 by 2000. Including all IGOs, average interstate ties grew from 12.72 to
28.95. Including just the prominent IGOs that existed both in 1950 and 2000, average inter-
state ties grew from .58 to 1.0. Overall, the density results are consistent with a scenario
where states rapidly increase their ties to IGOs, while the IGOs states connect to become
much less universalist in their membership proﬁles. Again, the density results suggest that
although opportunities for world polity ties grew enormously over the period as both the
population of IGOs and the population of states grew in number, the actual membership pro-
ﬁles of IGOs did not change in a way that produced a more densely interconnected network
of IGOs.
Centralization
World polity theory suggests that the world polity should be decentralized, and become
even less centralized over time, while world systems theory suggests a stably (or even
increasingly) centralized network, and the world civilizations approach suggests a low and
decreasing level of centralization. Table 5 shows the results for both sets of IGOs, and both the
binary and valued networks of IGOs and states. Note that the binary transformation of the
unimodal IGOs overlap and state co-membership matrices biases downward the centraliza-
tion of both networks as information on the level of overlap and co-membership between
dyads is lost. For instance, in the unimodal, binary IGO network, xij = 1 means that IGOs i and
j share at least one member state. However, what is lost in the sensitivity of the measurement
of ties is gained in interpretability of the centralization index, since the theoretical range of 0
to 1 applies only to the binary network. Thus, although I emphasize the binary-network
results, because the interpretation is clearer, I also discuss the valued-network results.
Table 4 •  Density of the World Polity, 1950 and 2000
Sample of prominent IGOs 1950 2000
IGO dyads—binary
  .636 .403
IGO dyads—valued 3.182 3.372
State dyads—binary  .492 .856
State dyads—valued .584 1.755
Population of IGOs
IGO dyads—binary .790 .528
IGO dyads—valued 6.505 6.828
State dyads—binary .903 .999
State dyads—valued 12.721 28.953
Notes: The sample of prominent IGOs includes 11 IGOs and 102
states in 1950; in 2000, it includes 50 IGOs and 206 states. The
population of IGOs includes 119 IGOs and 82 states in 1950; in
2000, it includes 330 IGOs and 190 states.
12. However, results from bootstrap z-tests suggest that the density of the unimodal state co-membership network
is signiﬁcantly different from 1.0, the density of a model world polity network where all states are interconnected
through IGOs (z = -5.04; see Snijders and Borgatti [1999] for a discussion of the bootstrap procedure). 
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The binary networks of IGOs are highly centralized in 2000, with the network of promi-
nent IGOs 62 percent as centralized as possible, the network of all IGOs 48 percent as central-
ized as possible, and the subsample of ten IGOs 42 percent as centralized as possible. In
structural terms, the inter-IGO network fairly closely resembles a star, with central IGOs tied
to many other IGOs through their member states, and a peripheral set of IGOs connected
only to the center and not to each other. This centralization was an increase over the levels of
44 percent, 21 percent, and 31 percent, respectively, observed for the three networks in 1950.
Centralization also increases in the valued IGO networks: from 6.38 to 18.53 for prominent
IGOs, from 13.33 to 26.68 for the population of IGOs, and from 6.47 to 20.69 for the con-
stant-IGOs subsample. Both the relatively high level of and the direction of change in central-
ization are at odds with the hypotheses drawn from world polity theory. These ﬁndings are
also inconsistent with the hypothesis of stable centralization drawn from world systems the-
ory, and the hypothesis of decreasing centralization taken from the world civilizations
approach. 
In contrast to the network of IGOs, the interstate network has become notably less cen-
tralized since 1950, consistent with world polity theory. In all three sets of IGOs, the inter-
state network was fairly centralized in 1950, but this centralization decreased dramatically
between 1950 and 2000 (from .46 to .13 for prominent IGOs, from .062 to .001 for the popu-
lation of IGOs, and from .46 to .14 for the ten constant-case IGOs), with states becoming
much more evenly tied to each other. Interestingly, the results for centralization using the
valued networks are more ambiguous: centralization increases for prominent IGOs from .88
to 1.79, and for the complete population of IGOs from 10.84 to 12.98, but decreases slightly
for the constant-IGOs subsample from .88 to .75. Taken together, this suggests some evidence
that there is more structural inequality even in the interstate network, if variation on the
strength of ties is incorporated into the analysis. Still, the ﬁnding of a low level of centraliza-
tion in the binary interstate network is generally consistent with the world civilizations
approach, and it contradicts the prediction of stable, high centralization drawn from world
systems theory.
Apart from the network-level centralization indices, it is also informative that the most
central IGOs and states in the world polity networks are those that would be anticipated by a
conﬂict-centered approach to the world polity (Beckﬁeld 2003). The UN, three large interna-
tional development banks, International Organization for Migration, and Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe are the most central IGOs, and the most central states
are all in the core: France, Canada, Belgium, the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom,
Table 5 • Centralization in the World Polity, 1950 and 2000
Sample of prominent IGOs 1950 2000
IGO dyads—binary .444 .622
IGO dyads—valued 6.378 18.532
State dyads—binary .458 .131
State dyads—valued .878 1.789
Population of IGOs
IGO dyads—binary .213 .475
IGO dyads—valued 13.330 26.680
State dyads—binary .062 .001
State dyads—valued 10.840 12.978
Notes: The sample of prominent IGOs includes 11 IGOs and 102 states
in 1950; in 2000, it includes 50 IGOs and 206 states. The population of
IGOs include 119 IGOs and 82 states in 1950; in 2000, it includes 330
IGOs and 190 states.
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and Germany. Informal scrutiny of the centralization results thus suggests that core states and
economic interests are at the center of the world polity.
World Polity, World System, and World Civilizations
World systems theory holds that the world polity is structured by the world system:
knowing which states are core, peripheral, and semiperipheral should explain which states
share ties to IGOs. Extending the world systems approach to the network analytic framework
suggests the hypothesis that core states share IGO memberships with semiperipheral and
peripheral states, but that semiperipheral and peripheral states do not share IGO member-
ships among themselves. That is, the only IGOs that weaker states belong to are those that
are dominated by the core (see Appendix B). Table 6 shows results from QAP correlation
analysis of the association between this model world system network and the observed uni-
modal state co-membership networks. Results are shown for both sets of IGOs, and for both
the binary and valued networks, since these networks reveal distinct dimensions of the struc-
ture of the world polity. 
In the valued networks, the world system model predicts world polity ties in both 1950
and 2000, for both sets of IGOs. Core-core, core-semiperipheral, and core-peripheral dyads
are have signiﬁcantly more shared IGO memberships than semiperipheral or peripheral
dyads. For prominent IGOs, the size of the correlation increases slightly (to a still-low level of
.17) over time, while for the complete population of IGOs, it decreases from .39 to .13.
13 This
may suggest that core dominance of IGOs is growing more pronounced in more visible, and
potentially more inﬂuential, IGOs, although more research is needed to test this hypothesis
directly. These ﬁndings for the world systems model suggest that the world system structures
the world polity. Speciﬁcally, the world polity is one where the core dominates the semipe-
riphery and periphery by including them in IGOs, while semiperipheral and peripheral states
tend to fail to form and join IGOs. 
The world civilizations approach to world politics holds that world political conﬂict is
increasingly structured by culture. It is alleged that states aligned with different “civiliza-
tions” are breaking apart, while states that share civilizations are banding closer together.
Table 6 • Fit of the Model World System Network to the 
World Polity, 1950 and 2000
Sample of prominent IGOs 1950 2000
State dyads—binary  .088* .069*
State dyads—valued  .135* .174*
Population of IGOs
State dyads—binary .107 .005
State dyads—valued .387* .127*
Notes: *p < .05, based on QAP correlation implemented in UCI-
NET 6, with 5,000 permutations (Borgatti et al. 2002); see text
for details. The sample of prominent IGOs includes 11 IGOs and
102 states in 1950; in 2000, it includes 50 IGOs and 206 states.
The population of IGOs includes 119 IGOs and 82 states in
1950; in 2000, it includes 330 IGOs and 190 states.
13. Because the model networks are binary, these Pearson correlation coefﬁcients may be biased downward. Sim-
ple matching coefﬁcients (available from the author) for QAP analyses using the binary networks are much larger, but
the direction of change in the coefﬁcients for the 1950–2000 comparison is identical to that shown in the tables. 
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Extending this approach to the network analytic framework suggests the hypothesis that
states’ memberships in IGOs should be associated with world civilization: those states that
share civilization should also share IGO ties (see Appendix B). This hypothesis can be tested
using QAP correlation analysis. Table 7 shows these associations between the observed net-
work of world polity ties and the model network drawn from the “clash of civilizations”
approach.
The world civilization model predicts IGO ties in the binary world polity network in
1950, but not in 2000 (neither correlation is signiﬁcant for the full set of IGOs). The correla-
tion between belonging to the same world civilization and sharing an IGO membership has
disappeared. If it only matters whether states do or do not share at least one common IGO
membership, then we can say that states join IGOs without regard to world civilization: in
this binary image, the world polity has disconnected from world civilization since 1950.
This is not the case if we allow for a valued world political network, one where not just
the presence or absence but the number of ties, i.e., the strength of bonds—is important.
The valued interstate co-membership matrix correlates signiﬁcantly with the world civiliza-
tion model in 1950 and 2000, though the correlation in 2000 is slightly smaller. For promi-
nent IGOs, the correlation shrinks from .34 to .31; for the full set of IGOs, the correlation
shrinks from .44 to .33. This indicates that alignment with a common civilization strength-
ens IGO ties between states, but that the effect of this alignment has weakened slightly with
time. Together with the ﬁndings from the binary network, we see that by the year 2000
states may be connected to or disconnected from each other regardless of civilization, but
that civilizational alignment does increase the strength of these connections. Again, because
“civilization” is so closely associated with geographic region, these results can also be inter-
preted as evidence for a signiﬁcant regionalization of the world polity. This association
between world civilization and world polity ties is stronger than that between world system
and world polity. 
In sum, the results from Tables 6 and 7 provide some support to all three perspectives on
the world polity. World systems theory is supported by the ﬁnding that the structure of the
world system is reproduced in the structure of the world polity. Likewise, the world polity is
also structured by world civilization and world region, which supports the world civilization
and regionalization approaches. Yet, signiﬁcantly, world polity receives support from results
showing that the associations between world system and world polity, and world civilization
and world polity, have declined in the more than 50 years since the establishment of the UN
system.
Table 7 • Fit of the Model World Civilization Network 
to the World Polity, 1950 and 2000
Sample of prominent IGOs 1950 2000
State dyads—binary  .180* .002
State dyads—valued  .343* .312*
Population of IGOs
State dyads—binary .057 .010
State dyads—valued .440* .325*
Notes: *p < .05, based on QAP correlation implemented in UCI-
NET 6, with 5,000 permutations (Borgatti et al. 2002); see text
for details. The sample of prominent IGOs includes 11 IGOs and
102 states in 1950; in 2000, it includes 50 IGOs and 206 states.
The population of IGOs includes 119 IGOs and 82 states in
1950; in 2000, it includes 330 IGOs and 190 states.
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Discussion
This article contributes to the growing literature on political globalization and the world
polity by revealing the network structure of IGOs. Though previous research on the world
polity conceptualizes it as a network, the world polity has not been analyzed appropriately as a
network (although the large effects of world polity network ties have been demonstrated).
Thus, there is a lack of fundamental research on the international organizations that increas-
ingly shape national policy and play a signiﬁcant role in political globalization. This article
develops and tests hypotheses drawn from world polity, world systems, and world civiliza-
tions approaches concerning various formal network properties of the world polity, including
density and centralization. While the network of states has become more densely intercon-
nected and less centralized, the network of IGOs that ties states together has itself become less
densely interconnected and more centralized. Also, model networks drawn from world sys-
tems theory and the world civilizations approach are signiﬁcantly associated with world pol-
ity ties, suggesting that world polity ties are spread unevenly, and reproduce material
inequality and cultural/geographic divides. Thus, a key contribution of this article is to high-
light some of the factors that shape the world polity ties that seem to be so inﬂuential for a
range of political and economic outcomes. One of these factors is place: civilization, strongly
related to geographic region, structures world polity ties, which suggests that the “world” pol-
ity may also be a world of densely integrated regional polities (Katzenstein 2005). The IGOs
of Western Europe, including the inﬂuential EU, are the best examples of this regionalization
(Beckﬁeld 2006; Fligstein 2007).
Findings from formal network analysis of the world polity hold several additional theo-
retical implications. Though density is a simple property of networks, it is also a revealing
one. The ﬁnding that the network of IGOs is sparse and has become even less dense over time
implies that prominent IGOs tend to be exclusive rather than universal in membership. Many
IGOs are explicitly regional in character (e.g. the North American Free Trade Agreement, and
the EU). As place is not innocent of power, the understanding of the world polity drawn from
world systems theory comes closest to accounting for this aspect of network structure. Still,
the structure of the world polity is more complex than world systems theory allows: the cor-
relation between an idealized world system network and the world polity is statistically sig-
niﬁcant but small. Also, world polity theory clearly has a large part of the story correct when
it comes to network density: very few states share no IGO memberships, and the percentage
of these null dyads in the network shrank to a very low level in 2000. This raises an impor-
tant question for future work: are state dyads that share no IGO memberships more different
from dyads that share one or more memberships, or are dyads that share fewer IGO member-
ships more different from dyads that share more memberships? Another way of asking the
question is: does world political conformity depend on the depth of embeddedness into the
world polity? 
The world systems account of the world polity also receives some support from the anal-
ysis of network centralization, but breaking the bimodal afﬁliation network into two unimo-
dal networks, one of IGOs and the other of states, reveals a nuanced picture. Centralization in
the world polity appears to result primarily from the IGO mode: the network of IGOs is
increasingly centralized around active IGOs that share member states with many other IGOs.
On the other hand, the network of states has become less centralized around central states
that have IGO memberships in common with many other states. The centralization results for
the unimodal networks suggest that world polity theory explains the structure of the inter-
state side of the network, while world systems theory accounts for the IGO side. Future
research should explore the extent to which this pattern of changing centralization is consis-
tent with the conﬂict-centered model of the world polity that builds on insights from both
the world systems and world polity approaches (Beckﬁeld 2003).
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The world civilizations approach of Huntington (1996) also receives support from the
results. Among state dyads, there is a signiﬁcant association between alignment with the same
civilization and the number of IGO co-memberships, both in 1950 and 2000. It seems that cul-
tural (or geographical) cleavages do correspond to political cleavages, as states from like cul-
tures (and places) join the same organizations while states from different cultures (and places)
join different ones. In the world polity, common cultures and proximate places do indeed
appear to be coming together. Still, the distinction between presence/absence and strength of
ties again appears in the world civilization results. Civilizational commonality is associated with
having at least one shared IGO membership in 1950, but not in 2000. This indicates that world
civilization strengthens political bonds, but that it may not explain their absence.
While I highlight the theoretical implications and contributions of this study, I also
acknowledge its limitations. First, although one strength of the study is its disaggregation of
the world polity through a focus on prominent IGOs that comprise a distinct and comparable
set of organizations, this focus is also a limitation. Future work should extend the network-
analytic approach employed here to other ﬁelds of international organizations, including
international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). Especially fruitful would be examina-
tions of IGOs at the center of the world polity, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)
(Goldman 2001), and analyses of speciﬁc global policy scripts (Boyle et al. 2001). Second,
while a strength of the study is its comparison of the structure of the world polity across two
theoretically-selected time points, its conclusions are necessarily limited to 1950 and 2000.
Future work should examine network data taken from a wider range of years. Third, the evo-
lution of the network structure of the world polity only tells part of the complex story of how
the world polity has evolved.
Thus, this study highlights several promising areas for future research on the world pol-
ity. First, the substantial regionalization of the “world” polity warrants further scrutiny to
determine what effects this regionalization has on the creation and diffusion of international
norms. Such research would be especially valuable because it could address longstanding
questions within the social network literature surrounding the relationship between network
structure and network content. For instance, one potentially fruitful line of inquiry could
compare the policy scripts of global organizations such as the UN or the OECD to the policy
scripts of regional organizations such as the EU. Second, while attention should of course be
given to the network of INGOs, further work could be done to disaggregate the ﬁeld of IGOs
and compare the effects of IGO embeddedness across IGO types (Boehmer et al. 2004; Ingram
et al. 2005). The recent work on IGOs from international relations and organizations scholars
should be used to inform new research on IGOs and INGOs. Such research should address,
for instance, the question of whether regional organizations have effects that are consistent
or inconsistent with those of universalist organizations, and, thus, have integrative or disinte-
grative implications for the world polity as a whole.
In sum, this study presents several new ﬁndings that advance the sociological literature
on the world polity and, more broadly, the social science of political globalization. Focusing
on the IGOs that form an essential part of the backbone of the world polity reveals that, even
in the context of growing interconnections among dyads of states, the network of IGOs that
states “plug in” to is only sparsely interconnected, and the density of interconnections among
IGOs has actually decreased over time. The network of IGOs is highly centralized, and has
become more so over time. Shared positions in the world system and the world of civiliza-
tions predict shared world polity ties, revealing that the world polity has an uneven structure
signiﬁcantly fragmented by material and symbolic conﬂict. As Anne-Marie Slaughter notes in
A New World Order (2004): “if ‘global government networks’ are in fact only partial govern-
ment networks, they will ultimately fail” (p. 228). The network analysis of IGOs presented
here shows that much work remains to be done before the world polity can be characterized
as a globally integrated government network.
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Appendix A. Extracts from Data Matrices
10 ¥ 10 Extract of Bimodal 2000 World Polity Network
  States:
A B B C G I M S U Z
IGOs: 
Arab League  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Common Market of the Southern Cone  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Commonwealth  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
European Union  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
North American Free Trade Agreement  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
North Atlantic Treaty Organization  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Organization for African Unity  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Organization of American States  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries  1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
United Nations  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
States: Algeria, Botswana, Brazil, China, Germany, Iran, Mexico, South 
Korea, United States, Zimbabwe
10 ¥ 10 Extract of Unimodal 2000 IGO Network
Ara MER Com EU  NAF NAT OAU OAS OPE UN
Arab League 22   0   0   0   0   0   9   0   7  21
MERCOSUR   0   4   0   0   0   0   0   4   0   4
Commonwealth   0   0  53   1   1   2  18  13   0  49
European Union   0   0   1  15   0  11   0   0   0  15
NAFTA   0   0   1   0   3   2   0   3   0   3
NATO   0   0   2  11   2  19   0   2   0  19
Organization for African Unity   9   0  18   0   0   0  53   0   3  52
Organization of American States  0   4  13   0   3   2   0  34   1  34
OPEC   7   0   0   0   0   0   3   1  11  11
United Nations  21   4  49   15  3  19  52  34  11 185
10 ¥ 10 Extract of Unimodal 2000 Interstate Network
Al Bo Br Ch Ge Ir Me SK US Zi
Algeria  8  3  2  2  2  3  1  2  2 3
Botswana  3  5  2  2  2  1  1  2  2 5
Brazil   2  2  7  3  4  1  4  3  5 2
China  2  2  3  5  4  1  2  5  5 2
Germany  2  2  4  4 14  1  3  6  9 2
Iran   3  1  1  1  1  5  1  2  2 1
Mexico   1  1  4  2  3  1  8  3  6 1
S. Korea   2  2  3  5  6  2  3  8  8 2
US   2  2  5  5  9  2  6  8 14 2
Zimbabwe   3  5  2  2  2  1  1  2  2 6
SP5503_06  Page 438  Wednesday, June 18, 2008  6:42 PMDual World Polity 439
Appendix B. Extracts from Model Matrices
10 ¥ 10 Extract of Model World Systems Network
G U I S A B B C M Z
Germany  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
United States  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iran  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Korea  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Algeria  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Botswana  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zimbabwe  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 ¥ 10 Extract of Model World Civilizations Network
G U B M B Z A I C S
Germany  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Botswana  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Zimbabwe  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Algeria  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Iran  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
China  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
South Korea  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
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